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REHBERG AND THE 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
IMMUNITY UNIFORMITY 
William Crawford Appleby IV* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Rehberg v. Paulk,
1
 the United States Supreme Court 
unanimously decided to grant absolute immunity to grand jury 
witnesses.
2
 Absolute immunity is defined as “[a] complete 
exemption from civil liability, [usually] afforded to officials while 
performing particularly important functions, such as a representative 
enacting legislation and a judge presiding over a lawsuit.”
3
 What the 
Rehberg holding means, essentially, is that a defendant who is 
indicted by a grand jury based on false witness testimony cannot 
bring a lawsuit against that witness for violating the defendant’s 
constitutional rights. 
This Comment examines Rehberg in detail, approving of its 
result while pointing out the negative consequences of its rationale. 
Part II presents relevant immunity law, including its historical 
framework. Part III lays out the facts of the case that led to the 
Court’s decision. Part IV breaks down the Court’s holding, including 
the arguments presented by Rehberg for why grand jury witnesses 
should not receive absolute immunity. Part V analyzes the following 
questions raised by this case: How effective is the threat of a perjury 
prosecution at deterring false testimony? Will the outcome in 
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 1. 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012). 
 2. Id. at 1510. 
 3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 818 (9th ed. 2009). 
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Rehberg help unscrupulous prosecutors bring trumped-up charges? 
Are adequate remedies still available to Rehberg? Finally, Part VI 
answers these questions by concluding that a potential perjury 
prosecution may not be very effective at deterring false testimony, 
unscrupulous prosecutors may use this holding to their advantage, 
and there are insufficient remedies available to plaintiffs like 
Rehberg. 
II.  IMMUNITY LAW 
Normally, a plaintiff can bring a lawsuit against a government 
agent for violating his or her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.
4
 This is a private right of action against someone who, while 
acting under color of law, deprives the plaintiff of “rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
5
 
Section 1983 is a codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.
6
 Following the Civil 
War, Congress outlawed slavery by enacting the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which led to an outbreak of violence in the South.
7
 To 
address this problem, Congress first passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, which was designed to defeat “attempt[s], under State laws, to 
deprive races and the members thereof” of their civil rights.
8
 Then, 
after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment bolstered the 
federal government’s constitutional authority over the states, 
Congress readopted the 1866 Act by passing the Civil Rights Act of 
1871.
9
 Nevertheless, § 1983 remained largely dormant until the 
Court decided Monroe v. Pape
10
 in 1961, at which time it became 
“the most important remedy for civil-rights violations by state and 
local officials.”
11
 
Although § 1983 is broad, the U.S. Supreme Court determined 
that it was never supposed to stray too far from tort law and its 
 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion of Absolute 
Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L. REV. 265, 268 n.17 (2006). 
 7. Id. at 268. 
 8. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 228 n.41 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 9. Johns, supra note 6, at 268. 
 10. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 11. Id. at 269. 
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common law immunities.
12
 This is supported by the fact that there is 
no evidence Congress meant to do away with all immunities when it 
enacted § 1983.
13
 The Court consistently followed this belief from 
the 1960s to today when making decisions about immunity and 
§ 1983.
14
 Using this rationale, the Court extended absolute immunity 
to legislators, judges, prosecutors, and trial witnesses.
15
 
Not all government agents receive absolute immunity for their 
actions; many receive only qualified immunity.
16
 “[Q]ualified 
immunity protects government officials from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”
17
 For example, “law enforcement officials who falsify 
affidavits . . . and fabricate evidence concerning an unsolved crime” 
receive only qualified immunity.
18
 An important procedural 
difference exists between absolute and qualified immunity.
19
 Under 
absolute immunity, if the scope of the immunity covers the agent’s 
actions, the civil suit is defeated at the outset.
20
 The application of 
qualified immunity, however, is determined by the evidence at trial 
and depends upon the agent’s motivations and the circumstances 
surrounding the agent’s actions.
21
 
In making a determination about which roles deserve absolute 
immunity, the Court applies a functional approach.
22
 This means that 
it looks to the common law to figure out which governmental 
functions were historically vital to society and how severely their 
operation would be affected by the threat of civil litigation.
23
 These 
government agents need to be shielded from personal liability so that 
they can freely and effectively perform their duties in service to the 
public.
24
 Although the Court looks to nineteenth-century common 
 
 12. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (2012). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1503. 
 16. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
 17. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18. Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1507 n.1 (citations omitted). 
 19. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1503. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. 
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law for guidance, it also does not “mechanically duplicat[e] the 
precise scope of the absolute immunity that the common law 
provided to protect those functions.”
25
 Therefore, in performing its 
immunity analysis, the Court recognizes that it must draw from both 
the past and the present in making determinations involving 
immunity. 
For example, in Imbler v. Pachtman,
26
 the Court held that 
prosecutors have absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for the actions 
they take to initiate a prosecution and present the State’s case.
27
 The 
Court regretfully stated that it realized this would leave criminal 
defendants without civil recourse.
28
 However, “qualifying a 
prosecutor’s immunity would disserve the broader public interest 
[and] . . . would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the 
prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the 
criminal justice system.”
29
 In addition, the Court pointed out that 
prosecutors are still subject to criminal punishment and professional 
discipline for misconduct.
30
 Based on this, the Court chose what it 
believed to be the lesser of two evils: “[B]etter to leave unredressed 
the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try 
to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”
31
 
In Briscoe v. LaHue,
32
 the Court extended absolute immunity to 
trial witnesses.
33
 The Court initially observed that a private party 
who provides testimony at trial is generally not subject to § 1983 
claims because his actions do not fall under color of law.
34
 But, the 
Court still felt it necessary to go beyond this analysis since 
“nongovernmental witnesses could act ‘under color of law’ by 
conspiring with the prosecutor or other state officials.”
35
 Ultimately, 
the Court decided to extend absolute immunity to trial witnesses for 
the same reasons that it extended immunity to judges and 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. 424 U.S. 409. 
 27. Id. at 431. 
 28. Id. at 427. 
 29. Id. at 427–28. 
 30. Id. at 428–29. 
 31. Id. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). 
 32. 460 U.S. 325 (1983). 
 33. Id. at 345–46. 
 34. Id. at 329–30. 
 35. Id. at 330 n.7. 
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prosecutors.
36
 The common law provided for witness immunity in 
1871, and the principles used to justify immunity for judges and 
prosecutors applied equally to witnesses.
37
 Even though they 
“perform a somewhat different function in the trial process[, their] 
participation in bringing the litigation to a just—or possibly unjust—
conclusion is equally indispensable.”
38
 
Although the Court resolved the question of trial-witness 
immunity in Briscoe, an open question remained: Should grand jury 
witnesses also receive absolute immunity? The role played by a 
witness before a grand jury is different from one at trial. A grand jury 
consists of a group of “people who are chosen to sit permanently for 
at least a month—and sometimes a year—and who, in ex parte 
proceedings, decide whether to issue indictments.”
39
 During this 
proceeding, the prosecutor presents evidence to the grand jury and 
asks them to issue an indictment, formally charging the defendant 
with a crime.
40
 The prosecutor is generally not obligated to present 
exculpatory evidence; evidence inadmissible at trial may be 
considered; and the defendant is usually not allowed to attend, much 
less present evidence, testify, or cross-examine the prosecution’s 
witnesses.
41
 The Court took all of this into account when it decided 
Rehberg. 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
According to an interview Charles Rehberg had with National 
Public Radio, the conflict began in 2003 when six doctors tried to 
open an outpatient surgery center in Albany, Georgia.
42
 Rehberg was 
their business manager.
43
 Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital (“the 
Hospital”)—the largest hospital in the city—strongly opposed their 
plan, using its political connections to do so.
44
 In response, Rehberg 
 
 36. Id. at 345–46. 
 37. Id. at 345. 
 38. Id. at 345–46. 
 39. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 767 (9th ed. 2009). 
 40. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1992); SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND 
JURY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1:8, 4:17 (2d ed. 2011). 
 41. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012) (No. 10-788), 2011 
WL 2310185, at *26. 
 42. Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court to Weigh Case of False Testimony, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/01/141879836/supreme-court-to-weigh-case-of-
false-testimony. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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undertook an investigation of the Hospital, uncovering its public IRS 
form.
45
 He discovered that—even though the Hospital was a 
nonprofit—its CEO earned almost $750,000 per year, it had a bank 
account in the Cayman Islands, it “was charging uninsured patients 
more than those covered by private insurance, Medicaid and 
Medicare, and it was aggressively taking poor patients to court when 
they couldn’t pay the full amount.”
46
 
Next, Rehberg began sending anonymous faxes to local 
community leaders and businesses, which he called “Phoebe 
Factoids.”
47
 These faxes exposed what Rehberg had learned about 
the way the Hospital was conducting business.
48
 In response, the 
Hospital called the local district attorney, Kenneth Hodges.
49
 Hodges 
and James Paulk, his office’s chief investigator, began to investigate 
Rehberg “as a favor to the Hospital.”
50
 In addition, the Hospital hired 
its own private investigators.
51
 
Hodges and Paulk began the investigation by subpoenaing 
Rehberg’s phone records from local telephone companies and his 
personal e-mails from his Internet service provider.
52
 Paulk gave 
these records to the Hospital’s civilian private investigators, who 
paid the district attorney’s office and the subpoenaed parties for the 
information.
53
 These civilian investigators “allegedly directed the 
substance of the subpoenas.”
54
 Eventually, negative press coverage 
of Hodges’s relationship with the Hospital caused Hodges to recuse 
himself from the case, and Kelly Burke was appointed as special 
prosecutor in his place.
55
 Hodges remained involved in the 
investigation after his recusal.
56
 
Rehberg was first indicted by a grand jury in December 2005 for 
burglary, aggravated assault, and six counts of making harassing 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 835 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012). 
 51. Totenberg, supra note 42. 
 52. Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 835. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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phone calls, with Paulk as the sole complaining witness.
57
 In the 
indictment, Rehberg was accused of breaking into the home of Dr. 
James A. Hotz—a hospital doctor
58
—and suggesting to Hotz that he 
had a weapon.
59
 When Rehberg contested the first indictment’s legal 
sufficiency, Burke dismissed the action.
60
 Burke then indicted 
Rehberg on similar charges twice more between February and March 
of 2006, but these indictments were eventually dismissed.
61
 Hotz 
testified during the second grand jury proceeding.
62
 
Following the indictments, Rehberg brought an action against 
Hodges, Burke, and Paulk in federal court.
63
 In his complaint, 
Rehberg stated that the charges were all false and that he had never 
been to Dr. Hotz’s house.
64
 In addition, no police report had ever 
been filed for Rehberg’s alleged crimes, and the local police 
department was never involved in the investigation.
65
 Paulk testified 
that the police were not involved because “of lack of confidence in 
the City police department to handle it.”
66
 According to the 
complaint, Paulk later “admitted that he never interviewed any 
witnesses or gathered any evidence indicating that Mr. Rehberg 
committed any aggravated assault or burglary.”
67
 Finally, when 
Judge Harry Altman dismissed the third indictment, he found that the 
faxes sent by Rehberg did not amount to harassing phone call 
violations under Georgia statutory law.
68
 
Rehberg’s complaint contained ten counts,
69
 and the four § 1983 
counts were at issue on appeal.
70
 The first and second § 1983 claims 
were against Hodges and Paulk for malicious prosecution and 
retaliatory prosecution.
71
 In the first count, Rehberg claimed that 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). 
 59. Joint Appendix at 4, Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012) (No. 10-788), 2011 WL 2311880, 
at *4. 
 60. Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 836. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Joint Appendix, supra note 59, at 8. 
 63. Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 836. 
 64. Joint Appendix, supra note 59, at 5. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 6. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 9. 
 69. Id. at 19–38. 
 70. Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 836 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012). 
 71. Joint Appendix, supra note 59, at 25, 30. 
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Hodges and Paulk violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 
conducting a “criminal investigation, indictment, and prosecution . . . 
induced by fabricated evidence and bad faith.”
72
 In the second count, 
Rehberg claimed they violated his First Amendment right to freedom 
of speech by bringing charges against him with no probable cause in 
response to the “Phoebe Factoid” faxes he sent.
73
 The third § 1983 
claim was against Burke for evidence fabrication, alleging that Burke 
had called Paulk to testify before a grand jury even though he “had 
not found any evidence that Mr. Rehberg committed a burglary or 
aggravated assault.”
74
 Finally, Rehberg’s fourth § 1983 claim was 
against Hodges, Burke, and Paulk for conspiracy to violate his 
constitutional rights in their above alleged actions.
75
 The defendants 
made a 12(b)(6) motion
76
 to dismiss these counts, claiming absolute 
immunity.
77
 However, the district court denied their motion.
78
 
Hodges, Burke, and Paulk then appealed to the Eleventh 
Circuit.
79
 The court of appeals reversed the district court’s decision, 
refusing to find an exception to absolute immunity for the testimony 
of a complaining witness in front of a grand jury.
80
 Drawing on the 
Eleventh Circuit’s earlier decision in Jones v. Cannon,
81
 the court 
reasoned that “allowing civil suits for false grand jury testimony 
would result in depositions, emasculate the confidential nature of 
grand jury testimony, and eviscerate the traditional absolute 
immunity for witness testimony in judicial proceedings.”
82
 The court 
went on to describe why criminal perjury charges—not civil 
liability—was the appropriate deterrent for false testimony.
83
 
Rehberg then appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
84
 The 
Court granted certiorari in order to resolve a conflict between the 
 
 72. Id. at 26. 
 73. Id. at 31. 
 74. Id. at 32. 
 75. Id. at 37. 
 76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12. 
 77. Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 837 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 854–55. 
 81. 174 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 82. Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 840. 
 83. Id. (citing Jones, 174 F.3d at 1287 n.10). 
 84. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1500–01 (2012). 
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circuit courts over whether complaining witnesses in grand jury 
proceedings are entitled to absolute immunity.
85
 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling
86
 and 
held that grand jury witnesses, just like trial witnesses, are entitled to 
absolute immunity.
87
 In reaching this decision, the Court found that 
the same reasons that justified granting absolute immunity to trial 
witnesses applied equally to grand jury witnesses.
88
 Without absolute 
immunity, grand jury witnesses might fear a retaliatory civil action 
against them for their testimony.
89
 The Court felt that civil liability 
was not needed to deter false testimony in light of the threat of 
criminal prosecution for perjury.
90
 As it had done in Briscoe, the 
Court refused to draw a distinction between lay witnesses and law 
enforcement witnesses for purposes of immunity.
91
 The Court 
decided this despite arguments that false testimony from police 
officers is potentially more damaging and that immunity is 
unnecessary because officers would not be intimidated by the threat 
of suit.
92
 
Next, the Court responded to each of Rehberg’s arguments 
requesting that it deny absolute immunity. First, Rehberg pointed out 
that precedent, namely Kalina v. Fletcher
93
 and Malley v. Briggs,
94
 
established that complaining witnesses do not get absolute 
immunity.
95
 “In those cases, law enforcement officials who 
submitted affidavits in support of applications for arrest warrants 
were denied absolute immunity because they performed the function 
of a complaining witness.”
96
 Based on these outcomes, Rehberg 
argued that certain grand jury witnesses also were not entitled to 
absolute immunity.
97
 However, the Court determined that Rehberg 
 
 85. Id. at 1501. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1510. 
 88. Id. at 1505. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1505–06. 
 93. 522 U.S. 118 (1997). 
 94. 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
 95. Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1507. 
 96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97. Id. 
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had misunderstood the true definition of a “complaining witness,” 
which was not one who testifies but instead one who initiates 
criminal prosecutions and procures arrests.
98
 Thus, police officers 
who testify before grand juries are not comparable to complaining 
witnesses since they do not make the decision to prosecute.
99
 In 
modern times, that responsibility falls on the prosecutor.
100
 The 
Court also pointed out the difficulty in determining who the 
complaining witness was when multiple grand jury witnesses 
testified, thereby showing how Rehberg’s argument was impractical 
as well.
101
 
Second, Rehberg asserted that grand jury proceedings are 
different from criminal trials because the defendant is not present and 
therefore cannot testify, present evidence, or cross-examine 
witnesses, and the prosecutor generally does not have to include 
exculpatory evidence.
102
 Since these procedural factors leave 
defendants with less protection than they have at trial, Rehberg 
argued that civil liability was more critical to deter false testimony in 
a grand jury proceeding.
103
 However, the Court disagreed. First, it 
reminded Rehberg that grand jury witnesses would probably testify 
again at trial anyway.
104
 It also decided that grand jury secrecy 
should trump these concerns.
105
 If the identities of grand jury 
witnesses could be determined through civil discovery, it would 
allow criminal defendants an opportunity to retaliate against them 
outside of court.
106
 This could scare away potential grand jury 
witnesses.
107
 
Finally, Rehberg argued that giving absolute immunity to grand 
jury witnesses would “create an insupportable distinction between 
States that use grand juries and those that do not.”
108
 Twenty-six 
states allow for felony prosecutions via information
109
 instead of 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1508. 
 101. Id. at 1508–09. 
 102. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41, at 26. 
 103. Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1509. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. An information is “[a] formal criminal charge made by a prosecutor without a grand-jury 
indictment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (9th ed. 2009). 
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grand jury proceedings.
110
 The Court responded by stating that an 
analogy between grand jury witnesses and preliminary hearing 
witnesses was more appropriate, since both proceedings involve 
testimony.
111
 In addition, “lower courts have held that witnesses at a 
preliminary hearing are protected by the same immunity accorded 
grand jury witnesses . . . and [Rehberg did] not argue 
otherwise . . . .”
112
 Therefore, the Court found none of Rehberg’s 
arguments against granting grand jury witnesses absolute immunity 
to be convincing. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court was correct to decide that grand jury witnesses and 
trial witnesses should have identical immunity. Denying grand jury 
witnesses the same immunity enjoyed by trial witnesses would be 
inconsistent and make little sense. Just as it would with trial-witness 
testimony, the fear of subsequent liability would surely have a 
negative impact on the testimony of a grand jury witness. In addition, 
the secrecy of a grand jury proceeding is vital to its proper 
functioning. Allowing a criminal defendant to undermine this 
secrecy by obtaining the names and contact information of grand jury 
witnesses through civil discovery would make witnesses even less 
likely to testify. For these reasons, the Court was correct to grant 
absolute immunity to grand jury witnesses. To hold otherwise would 
undermine grand jury proceedings in a way that could render them 
almost totally ineffective. 
Even though the Court’s holding in Rehberg was correct, the 
decision still raises a few questions: How effective is the threat of a 
perjury prosecution at deterring false testimony? Will prosecutors 
who intend to bring trumped-up charges be able to use this holding to 
their advantage? Finally, are defendants like Rehberg left with an 
adequate legal recourse? Each of these questions is addressed in the 
sections that follow. 
A.  Perjury as a Deterrent 
In responding to Rehberg’s arguments, the Court stated that “the 
deterrent of potential civil liability [was not] needed to prevent 
 
 110. Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1509. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1510. 
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perjurious testimony” mainly because the threat of a subsequent 
perjury prosecution would discourage false testimony.
113
 In support 
of its rationale, the Court cited to Briscoe v. LaHue,
114
 in which it 
granted absolute immunity to trial witnesses and relied upon perjury 
as a deterrent to false police officer trial testimony.
115
 But will the 
threat of prosecution for perjury adequately deter grand jury 
witnesses from testifying falsely? 
One commits perjury “if in any official proceeding he makes a 
false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or 
affirms the truth of a statement previously made, when the statement 
is material and he does not believe it to be true.”
116
 Perjury began as 
a common law crime but is now governed by statute.
117
 For example, 
perjury committed before a federal grand jury is controlled by 18 
U.S.C. § 1623.
118
 In order to convict someone of perjury, the 
prosecutor must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant knowingly made a false statement of material fact while 
under oath and before a competent tribunal.
119
 When a false 
statement is made before a grand jury, it “must be material ‘to a 
matter that the grand jury has the power to investigate.’”
120
 
Although the Court relied on the threat of a perjury prosecution 
to deter false testimony, there are several reasons why this may not 
be as effective as it appears. First, perjury is very difficult to prove. 
The requirements of proof are some of the most stringent in all of 
law.
121
 One reason for this is the “two-witness rule,” which states 
that the defendant cannot be found guilty for perjury based on the 
testimony of a single uncorroborated witness.
122
 The prosecutor must 
prove his or her case using at least the “testimony of two independent 
witnesses or one witness and corroborating circumstances.”
123
 
Prosecutors also will have difficulty demonstrating criminal intent or 
that the defendant knew his or her testimony was false. Knowledge 
 
 113. Id. at 1505. 
 114. 460 U.S. 325 (1983). 
 115. Id. at 342. 
 116. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 (1985). 
 117. 60A AM. JUR. 2D Perjury § 1 (2003). 
 118. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006). 
 119. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). 
 120. 60A AM. JUR. 2D Perjury § 6 (2003). 
 121. State v. Olson, 594 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Wash. 1979). 
 122. Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 607–09 (1945). 
 123. Id. at 607. 
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and intent can only be inferred from the surrounding circumstances 
of the case,
124
 which makes proving these elements difficult. In 
addition, if the defendant gave a false answer due to confusion, 
faulty memory, honest mistake,
125
 inadvertence,
126
 or a belief that 
what he or she was saying was true,
127
 then the statement is not 
perjury. For these reasons, the bar to convict for perjury is set very 
high. 
Second, a defendant has no control over whether a witness will 
be charged with perjury. In fact, there is usually no civil action for 
perjury,
128
 and generally, only a prosecutor can decide whether to 
pursue a criminal case for perjury.
129
 As mentioned above, Paulk is 
the chief investigator for the district attorney’s office in which the 
alleged perjury was committed.
130
 If members of that same office 
collaborated with Paulk to bring trumped-up charges against 
Rehberg, it is unlikely that those colleagues would hold Paulk 
accountable. In similar situations, there is equally little chance that 
criminal investigators who commit perjury on the stand will be 
prosecuted or even charged. With such stringent requirements of 
proof and a low incentive to prosecute in cases like Rehberg, the 
threat of a perjury prosecution alone may not effectively dissuade 
future witnesses from lying on the stand. 
B.  Charging Instrument 
The Rehberg holding also has the potential negative effect of 
giving prosecutors an effective tool to bring unsubstantiated charges 
against defendants. As mentioned in Rehberg’s brief, twenty-six 
states allow the prosecutor to decide the way in which the defendant 
will be charged for all crimes.
131
 In all but two states, “prosecutors 
have their choice of charging instrument—indictment or 
information—when prosecuting at least some classes of crimes.”
132
 
 
 124. State v. Boratto, 404 A.2d 604, 608 (N.J. 1979). 
 125. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). 
 126. United States v. Martellano, 675 F.2d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 127. United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 622–23 (3d Cir. 1954). 
 128. W. G. Platts Inc. v. Platts, 438 P.2d 867, 871 (Wash. 1968). “Maine is the only state that 
recognizes a civil action for perjury.” Spickler v. Greenberg, 644 A.2d 469, 470 n.1 (Me. 1994). 
 129. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (3d ed. 2007). 
 130. See supra Section III. 
 131. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41, at 23–24. 
 132. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, prosecutors generally have quite a bit of freedom when 
selecting the charging mechanism. 
As described above, if the prosecutor chooses to charge by 
indictment, then a grand jury will ultimately decide whether there is 
probable cause to support the charges.
133
 Since the prosecutor alone 
presents evidence to the grand jury, and because grand juries usually 
return indictments, critics refer to this charging instrument as a mere 
“rubber stamp” for prosecutors.
134
 
Generally, once the grand jury returns an indictment, an arrest 
warrant for the defendant is automatically issued.
135
 This is because 
an indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of 
“probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”
136
 For example, 
Rehberg was arrested as a result of the indictments against him.
137
 
Even though Paulk’s testimony served as the basis for the grand jury 
to indict Rehberg, Rehberg cannot sue Paulk because Paulk has 
absolute immunity from civil liability for his testimony.
138
 However, 
if Paulk had instead submitted a false sworn affidavit in support of 
bringing charges against Rehberg, he would only be granted 
qualified immunity.
139
 This would allow Rehberg to bring an action 
against Paulk under § 1983. 
As Rehberg’s brief to the Supreme Court states, this creates an 
inconsistency in criminal procedure among states.
140
 However, it is 
even more worrisome that unscrupulous prosecutors can now use the 
grand jury charging mechanism to bring fabricated charges. Since 
grand jury witnesses and prosecutors both receive absolute immunity 
from civil liability, they have nothing to fear from bringing false 
charges except a subsequent perjury prosecution. However, as 
 
 133. See supra Section II. 
 134. Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the 
Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2002). 
 135. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 129, at 
§ 11.2(b) n.48.7. 
 136. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129. 
 137. Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 836 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1510 
(2012); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41, at 4. 
 138. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1510 (2012). 
 139. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129–31; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340–45 (1986). 
 140. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 41, at 9–10 (“A person victimized by malicious 
falsehoods could bring a claim in a State in which written affidavits were sufficient to instigate a 
prosecution, but absolute immunity would bar a claim from an identically situated person in a 
State in which an indictment was required.”). 
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explained above,
141
 the threat of prosecution for perjury may not be 
much of a deterrent to witnesses like Paulk. 
C.  Remaining Remedies 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit 
remanded Rehberg back to the district court with only the retaliatory 
prosecution claim against Paulk intact.
142
 Rehberg’s state law causes 
of action against Paulk for negligence and invasion of privacy—
consisting of counts one through four
143
—were not at issue on 
appeal.
144
 Therefore, out of the ten causes of action stated in 
Rehberg’s complaint, only numbers one through four and seven 
remain. 
Retaliatory prosecution claims require the plaintiff to “show an 
absence of probable cause for the prosecution” and “a ‘but-for’ 
causal connection between the retaliatory animus of the non-
prosecutor and the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute.”
145
 The 
Eleventh Circuit held that the allegations in Rehberg’s complaint 
were sufficient to establish a prima facie case for retaliatory 
prosecution, which means that the burden shifts to Paulk on 
remand.
146
 
Even though Rehberg still has counts one through four and 
seven against Paulk, these remedies are insufficient. First, Hodges 
should be just as liable as Paulk for retaliatory prosecution, but the 
Eleventh Circuit held that Hodges is protected by absolute 
immunity.
147
 Under Hartman v. Moore, retaliatory prosecution 
claims cannot be brought against the prosecutor involved but are 
instead brought against the non-prosecutor “who may have 
influenced the prosecutorial decision but did not himself make 
it . . . .”
148
 The district court denied absolute and qualified immunity 
 
 141. See supra Section V.A. 
 142. Rehberg v. Paulk, 682 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Hodges has 
absolute immunity from the retaliatory prosecution claim but Paulk does not. Rehberg, 611 F.3d 
at 855. 
 143. “Rehberg withdrew Count 5 against Dougherty County in response to its claim of 
sovereign immunity,” and the district court dismissed count nine. Id. at 837 n.4. Counts five and 
nine were not at issue on appeal. Id. 
 144. Id. at 836 n.3. 
 145. Id. at 848–49. 
 146. Id. at 849–50. 
 147. Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 849. 
 148. Id. at 848 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261–62 (2006)). 
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to Paulk, a decision that the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
149
 It is 
patently unfair to hold only Paulk accountable for a retaliatory 
prosecution that was allegedly started and orchestrated by Hodges. 
Second, Paulk is the only defendant left in all of Rehberg’s 
remaining causes of action. As explained above, none of the 
remaining counts are against Hodges and Burke. What this means, 
essentially, is that Hodges and Burke are untouchable and will not be 
held accountable for their actions in Rehberg. They are immune from 
any civil legal recourse available to Rehberg simply because they are 
prosecutors. In addition, if Paulk had only provided false testimony 
to the grand jury and had not engaged in any of the other alleged 
illegal activities surrounding the investigation, Rehberg might have 
been left with no causes of action at all. Because Rehberg’s remedies 
are limited and he can only sue Paulk, Rehberg’s remedies for the 
severe violations of his constitutional rights are insufficient. 
On a side note, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out how “Hodges 
and Paulk generally would not receive absolute immunity for 
fabricating evidence, because investigating and gathering evidence 
falls outside the prosecutor’s role as an advocate.”
150
 Although this 
cause of action would be helpful if there were physical evidence, a 
false affidavit, proof that a witness was convinced to testify falsely, 
or other forms of evidence from the investigation,
151
 this was not the 
case in Rehberg and it is unlikely to be the case in future actions of a 
similar nature. If the only fabricated evidence is testimony before a 
grand jury, then a fabrication of evidence claim does not apply.
152
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In deciding to extend absolute immunity to grand jury witnesses 
in Rehberg, the Court created immunity uniformity between trial and 
grand jury witnesses. Although this decision was necessary to protect 
the secrecy of grand jury proceedings as well as to protect grand jury 
witnesses from subsequent defendant retaliation, the holding creates 
a serious concern. Because prosecutors and grand jury witnesses are 
immune from civil liability in cases like Rehberg and because 
perjury may not be an effective deterrent to false testimony, there is 
 
 149. Id. at 850, 855. 
 150. Id. at 841. 
 151. See id. at 842 & n.10. 
 152. Id. at 842. 
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no real deterrent in place to prevent this kind of behavior in the 
future. 
As Judge Learned Hand famously wrote, “[a]s is so often the 
case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils 
inevitable in either alternative.”
153
 Unfortunately for Charles 
Rehberg, his ability to seek retribution and defend his constitutional 
rights currently sits on the side of the scale carrying the greater of 
two evils. Indeed, until a more effective deterrent to preventing false 
testimony during grand jury proceedings emerges, trumped-up 
charges may continue to be brought against innocent people. The 
threat of criminal prosecution for perjury is simply not enough to 
dissuade prosecutors and witnesses immune from civil liability. 
  
 
 153. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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